


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
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South Vietnam; Enemy activity was generally light over the weekend, but there is increasing evidence in all four corps areas that the Communists are nearly ready for renewed offensive action.

Enemy artillery fire from the eastern end of the Demilitarized Zone increased substantially in the past two days.

In II and III Corps there is mounting evidence in agent and prisoner reporting that attacks may be directed against Pleiku city and Saigon within the next two weeks. The North Vietnamese 7th Division and the Viet Cong 9th Division have been brought up to strength, according to ralliers, and there are indications that they will participate in a "third round" offensive to commence on or about 15 August.

In IV Corps there are several prisoner reports indicating that as many as eight Viet Cong main force battalions may be moving out of the delta to participate in an attack on Saigon. Recent clashes with unidentified enemy units in Sa Dec and Vinh Long provinces suggest the Communists may be attempting to screen troop movements toward the capital.

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[USSR-Czechoslovakia: Dubcek has bought permission to pursue his domestic reform at the cost of giving up thoughts of independent economic, defense, and foreign policies.

In his speech to the nation yesterday, Dubcek naturally accentuated the positive side of the Bratislava and Cierna agreements, but he left no doubt that he had given up one of the political premises that had brought him to power, namely, that the capitalist world was no longer a threat to Czechoslovakia. On the other hand, the Soviets accepted--with reservations--Dubcek's other main premise: that the class struggle in Czechoslovakia was over and Communists could rule the country by consensus rather than by force.

The Bratislava declaration of 3 August indicates some of the specific Czechoslovak concessions, and loopholes in the language reflect the reservations of the other signatories about Czechoslovakia's future domestic course. Dubcek recognized an obligation to defend "socialist achievements," a phrase which provides justification for future intervention or demands for stricter Communist control by the other signers. The Czechoslovak delegation reversed itself and acknowledged that the leading role of Communist parties is under attack and that "extraordinary vigilance" is required in this regard, a proposition which could spell trouble for the Czechoslovak liberals. The promise of harmonization of Prague's economic, defense and foreign policies with those of the hard-line Warsaw Pact nations may have put the Czechoslovaks on a road from which they will have great difficulty in deviating, even if it adversely affects their domestic plans. Furthermore, in his speech, Dubcek mentioned promises on all sides to discontinue public polemics, a calming statement but one which also contains in it the seeds of censorship.]

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[Czechoslovak commitments to the Warsaw Pact, according to Premier Cernik, not only preclude reducing the Czechoslovak Army, but also will mean "increasing the state of its potential." Cernik spoke in the context of guarding the country's western frontiers, which suggests that Soviet demands at Cierna for stationing troops along the border had been deflected by the Czechoslovaks' promises to improve their defense capabilities, probably including the capabilities of reserve forces.

Yesterday's announcement of the appointment of Soviet General S. M. Shtemenko as the new chief of staff of the Warsaw Pact forces may be a signal that personnel and structural changes in the Pact are now in order. There is, however, no direct evidence that his assignment is in fact a result of the crisis.

The Bratislava declaration called for a meeting soon of top leaders on increased economic cooperation. Dubcek said that during the talks at Bratislava, it was also agreed to examine further, presumably at future meetings, such matters as Communist unity, the struggle against imperialism, and cooperation among Communist states. Such a series of meetings would also probably be designed to keep the pressure on the Czechoslovaks to conform.

No participant at Bratislava was completely satisfied. Hungarian party boss Kadar has been quoted as saying "certain differences...possibly may have remained." Kadar did not specify what the differences were, but he was probably reflecting the concern that he undoubtedly shares with the East German and Polish leaders over the political impact in their own countries of the Czechoslovak domestic reforms. Kadar is relatively secure because of his permissive leadership, but Ulbricht and Gomulka may be in for trouble.

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[The East German regime is rigidly orthodox and has allowed little domestic political relaxation. It probably will continue the precautionary measures it has already taken to insulate the population from Czechoslovak political contamination and to reverse strong popular sympathy for Prague. In the long run, however, this probably will not suffice.

Poland's Gomulka faces more immediate problems. His formerly unchallenged authority was seriously weakened by riots last March which were fed by the democratization process in Czechoslovakia.

Obviously aware that the results of the crisis, as Ambassador Thompson comments, make the Soviets look "a little silly," Moscow's propagandists are putting the best possible gloss on the outcome. Soviet press and radio commentary uniformly praises the Cierna and Bratislava meetings as a victory for Communist unity and a frustration of imperialist hopes, with Pravda characterizing the talks as the kind of "wise, calm, thoughtful, and patient" diplomacy typical of relations between Communist states.

Czechoslovak news media announced on 3 August that the last Soviet army units left Czechoslovakia on that date.

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Congo (Brazzaville): The army apparently took control of the government on the morning of 3 August.

Brazzaville radio stated the army had assumed power because President Massamba-Debat had carried out a series of illegal acts, including the dissolution of the National Assembly and the party's political bureau, and had allowed the country's "revolutionary institutions" to stagnate. The statement asserted the army and the civil defense corps militia would maintain order in Brazzaville.

A later announcement named Defense Secretary Poignet acting chief of state "in the absence of the President." Poignet, considered a protégé of Massamba-Debat, was given the defense portfolio last January when the President fired his radical leftist prime minister. Brazzaville radio also announced the appointment of former paracommando chief, Capt. Ngouabi, as commander in chief of the army.

The initial statement of the army takeover, which was apparently engineered by Ngouabi, invited Massamba-Debat to "resume a dialogue" with the army, the militia, and the other "vital and conscious forces" of the country. Following subsequent radio appeals that he "rejoin his colleagues" and guarantees of safety from Ngouabi, Massamba-Debat returned to the presidential palace on 4 August after a 24-hour absence.

The President met with cabinet members at noon on 4 August. The entire cabinet, after issuing a statement of support for Massamba-Debat, resigned to permit talks on a new government. [REDACTED]

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Brazil: Renewed student disorders seem likely and may well give added impetus to the growing military disenchantment with President Costa e Silva.

Students are returning to class after a long vacation, and student leaders plan new demonstrations to protest the government's failure to enact needed educational reforms. The government expects to announce some changes in the system, but these are likely to be too little and too late to satisfy the students, who seem bent on challenging the official ban on demonstrations. Clashes between students and security forces seem inevitable.

Radical student leaders are also trying hard to establish a working alliance with labor, which has traditionally been fearful of exploitation by "rich men's sons." One national labor confederation has adopted, but not ratified, a strongly antigovernment declaration that gives full support to the students' demands. Students were reported to be involved in recent wildcat strikes in Sao Paulo, and more strikes are planned in order to draw attention to legitimate worker grievances that are largely ignored by the government.

Military leaders are known to be particularly chary of any alliance between students and workers, and are prepared to use whatever force is necessary to put down disorders. In the past, such harsh measures have stimulated additional problems by increasing open popular discontent with the government, which in turn increases military unrest.

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Indonesia: The arrival in West Irian later this month of a special UN representative may complicate the carrying out of the "plebiscite" scheduled there next year.

Recent statements by the representative to the effect that he will preside over "a completely free election" or resign suggest differences in expectation and interpretation that could lead to disagreement with the Indonesians over the implementation of the act.

The Indonesian Government regards the retention of West Irian as basic to its national policy. It intends for the "plebiscite," called for in the 1962 agreement with the Netherlands, to be carried out in such a way as to maintain this policy. The government hopes to establish a West Irian council of hand-picked district representatives responsive to Jakarta and traditional tribal chiefs who can be made to see the practicality of remaining with Indonesia.

Should the UN representative believe that this method is not sufficiently representative of the people's wishes, it could produce embarrassing pressures on Indonesia's desire to carry out the act in a meaningful way and yet retain West Irian.

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Israel-Jordan: A serious border incident occurred yesterday when Israeli jets bombarded Jordanian settlements north of the Dead Sea and Israeli tanks exchanged fire with Jordanian forces across the Jordan River. The Israelis announced that the action was launched against two major centers of Arab terrorism, one of them the headquarters of the Fatah organization. The Israelis said that they had made the strike in retaliation for a recent upsurge of terrorist incidents from bases in Jordan. [Amman has requested an emergency UN Security Council meeting on the incident.]

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Nigeria: Biafran leader Ojukwu announced on 3 August that he would head his delegation to the peace talks scheduled to open today in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Ojukwu also ordered his troops to cease fire unless fired upon while the talks are in session. Lagos promptly denounced the order as a Biafran attempt to buy time to gain further international recognition and import more arms. Lagos believes that Ojukwu is already getting arms from France--which publicly supported Biafran independence last week--via Ivory Coast. It remains unlikely that either side will make meaningful political concessions toward a peaceful settlement.

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USSR: The Soviets are proposing to various UN members that a new international communications satellite organization be established. The organization, to be called Inter-Sputnik, presumably would rival the International Telecommunications Consortium (INTELSAT), whose membership includes 62 nations. It is unlikely that the USSR's plan will receive more than token support within INTELSAT, although its provision giving each member an equal vote will find sympathetic ears among many INTELSAT members. The Soviet plan almost certainly will complicate the negotiations for a long-term INTELSAT agreement in 1969.

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